We propose an intermediation core for an economy that explicitly specifies how traders organize themselves into trade cooperatives (intermediaries) and how trade between them gets carried out. The intermediation core allocations are closely related to the equilibrium allocations of a non-cooperative intermediation game in Townsend (1983) . We show that the intermediation core contains all subgame perfect equilibrium allocations of the intermediation game, similar to the inclusion of competitive equilibrium allocations in the core usually studied. We identify intermediation core allocations that are also subgame perfect equilibrium allocations of the intermediation game in terms of the supporting intermediary structures. These results help to characterize subgame perfect equilibrium allocations of the intermediation game and to analyze their welfare and stability properties.
Introduction
The core of an exchange economy is based on coalitional rather than individualistic improvements that depend on what each coalition can achieve with its own members. The usual core is based on the assumption that any reallocation of coalition's total endowment among its members is feasible for the coalition. However, it is unclear how members organize themselves into the coalition and how they carry out the trade. This paper has two purposes. First, we use the idea of intermediation to explicitly specify how economic traders organize themselves into trade cooperatives and how trade between them is carried out. This calls for the reformulation of what would be feasible for a coalition of traders to achieve. In this paper, an allocation is feasible for a coalition of traders if one of them acts as an intermediary, offering to buy and sell at a price vector, while the others act as price-taking customers. At each feasible allocation of a coalition, all members, possibly except for the intermediating trader, maximize their utility subject to budget constraints. For an allocation to be feasible for the economy, ✩ We thank the editor and an anonymous referee for comments that helped to greatly improve the paper. Tee Kilenthong would like to thank the University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce for its financial support.
however, we allow for the possibility that trade is carried out by multiple disjoint intermediaries. The core resulting from this formulation of coalitional feasible allocations will be referred to as the intermediation core. 1 Second, we relate intermediation core allocations with subgame-perfect equilibrium allocations under the approach taken in Townsend (1983) . This approach provides an opportunity for each trader to play the role of an intermediary. One formalization of the approach works as follows. In the first stage, each trader individually and simultaneously offers to buy or sell commodities at a certain price vector and for a certain group of customers, subject to feasibility constraints. A trader may be offered a membership to multiple intermediaries. However, each trader must subsequently choose to trade with at most one intermediary in the second stage. Furthermore, a trader is obligated to intermediate under the announced terms should some of his potential customers choose to trade with him. Otherwise, he is free to act as the customer of an intermediary that includes him as a customer.
2 Because a trader's second-stage feasible choices 1 Feasible coalitional allocations in this paper are different from those in both Mas-Colell (1975) and Qin et al. (2006) . In the former, the feasible allocations of a coalition are required to be in competitive equilibrium of the sub-economy composed of members of the coalition, whereas in the latter, no one is required to maximize utility subject to budget constraints. 2 This is one of the several variants of the model in Townsend (1983) . See Townsend (1978) , Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Boyd et al. (1988) depend on the choices of other traders, the social equilibrium in Debreu (1952) 3 is applied to the subgames in the second stage in the determination of a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
An SPE of the intermediation game has the following properties. First, each non-intermediating trader maximizes utility by choosing an intermediary to trade with as well as the trade amount. Second, traders divide themselves into disjoint trading cooperatives, such that there is an active intermediating trader within each cooperative who specifies the terms of trade. Third, trade is stable in the sense that there is no entry of new intermediaries or exit of existing ones. 4 We show that SPE allocations of the intermediation game are contained in the intermediation core under general conditions, similar to the inclusion of competitive equilibrium allocations in the usual core. We identify intermediation core allocations that are also SPE allocations in terms of the supporting intermediary structures. It is shown that an intermediation core allocation can be decentralized as an SPE allocation, whenever all intermediaries in the supporting intermediary structure have at least two customers. This stability of the intermediation core allocations resembles the contestability concept found in the industrial organization literature (Baumol et al., 1982) . In particular, the two-customer requirement ensures that, for any active intermediary, there are always at least two contestable intermediaries that are ready to serve the other customers under the same terms.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on implementation of social choice correspondences using extensive form mechanisms and subgame-perfect equilibrium as a solution concept.
5
A group of papers in this literature considers subgame-perfect implementation of cooperative game-theoretic solutions. For example, Serrano and Vohra (1997) and several others consider the core usually studied as the social correspondence and its subgame-perfect implementation. In a similar spirit to theirs, viewing the intermediation game (or the rules of the intermediation game) as an extensive form mechanism, our results establish a subgame-perfect implementation of intermediation core allocations that are supportable by intermediaries with two or more customers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the intermediation core, intermediation game, and subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Section 3 establishes the main results and Section 4 concludes. Appendix A contains proofs of theorems, and Appendix B presents an example of an unequal treatment of the intermediation core.
Intermediation in an exchange economy
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of traders and l (<∞) be the number of commodities. Trader i ∈ N has consumption set 
Intermediation core
The core concept is based on what players can achieve by organizing themselves into coalitions. For the usual core of an 3 Yannelis (2009) generalizes this social equilibrium concept by allowing for asymmetric information and a continuum of agents.
4 An existing intermediary with revised terms is regarded as a new intermediary.
5 The interested reader is referred to Moore and Repullo (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1990) , which were among the earlier papers in the literature.
exchange economy, any allocation satisfying
is regarded as feasible for traders in coalition C . This feasibility condition does not explicitly specify how traders organize themselves into coalition C and how trade between them is carried out. In this paper, we make the organization of traders into a coalition and trade between them explicit by requiring one of these traders to intermediate for the rest of them.
is feasible for coalition C if it satisfies (1) and there exists a price vector p such that
for all i ∈ C except for at most one member j in C , in which case j
The set of all C -feasible allocations is denoted by F (C). The trader whose bundle does not maximize utility subject to budget constraints at an allocation in F (C) is the intermediating trader.
The remaining members are the customers of the intermediary. If each member's bundle maximizes utility subject to budget constraints, any one of them can be the intermediating trader.
. . , m, and there is no coalition C ⊆ N and
Given an intermediation core allocation x * , we call the
a supporting intermediary structure for the allocation x * if, for each coalition k, price vector p * k supports allocation (x * i ) i∈C * k ∈ F (C * k ). Note that to be in the intermediation core, we allow for an allocation of the economy to be achievable through multiple disjoint intermediaries in stead of just one grand intermediary. The intermediation core remains the same if for any coalition C , we modify F (C) by allowing trade between members in coalition C to be achievable though multiple disjoint intermediaries. The reason for this is that if a partition of C can improve upon a given allocation, then any sub-coalition in the partition can also improve upon the allocation.
The following example illustrates that the intermediation core of an economy is not included in its usual core. 
= (6, 10) is not in the usual core of this economy because it is not Pareto optimal.
However,x is in the intermediation core. Consider the following supporting intermediary structure. Let trader 3 be an intermediary with a price ratio ρ = p 1 /p 2 and with traders 1 and 2 as customers. The demand of each customer is (3, 3ρ). As a result, the allocation of the intermediary is (12, 12) − 2 × (3, 3ρ) = (6, 12 − 6ρ). It is clear that allocationx can be supported by price ratio ρ = 1/3. We will show that this allocation cannot be improved upon. It is clear that no individual trader alone can improve allocationx.
We now consider grand coalitions. If trader 3 is an intermediary, then it is impossible to make traders 1 and 2 better off without making trader 3 worse off. If trader 1 is an intermediary with a price ratio ρ, traders 2 and 3 demand (3, 3ρ) and (6/ρ, 6), respectively. This leaves trader 1 with bundle (9 − 6/ρ, 6 − 3ρ). A simple calculation shows that to make traders 2 and 3 better off, ρ must satisfy 1/3 < ρ < 3/5. However, as the intermediating agent, trader 1 is worse off over this range of the price ratio. Due to symmetry, a grand coalition with trader 2 as the intermediary cannot improve upon allocationx. Now consider a two-member coalition consisting of traders 1 and 3. If trader 3 intermediates, then trader 1 demands (3, 3ρ) at price ratio ρ leaving trader 3 with bundle (3, 12 − 3ρ). It follows that trader 3 is necessarily worse off should trader 1 become better off. If trader 1 intermediates, however, trader 3 demands (6/ρ, 6) at price ratio ρ, leaving trader 1 with bundle (6 − (6ρ), 6). For trader 3 to be better off, the price ratio must be ρ < 3/5, which would result in a negative quantity of good 1 for trader 1. This is clearly not feasible. Due to symmetry, the same conclusion can be drawn from a coalition including traders 2 and 3. A coalition including traders 1 and 2 cannot improve uponx because they are endowed with good 1 only.
In conclusion, allocationx cannot be improved upon by any coalition.
Coalition improvements for the intermediation core are more restrictive than those for the usual core. As a result, because a competitive equilibrium allocation is in the core, it must be in the intermediation core as well. We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Competitive equilibrium allocations are intermediation core allocations.
An immediate implication of this proposition is that the intermediation core of an economy is non-empty under general conditions. For example, if the consumption set is non-empty, closed, convex, bounded below, and unbounded above, and the utility function is increasing and concave, then a competitive equilibrium exists. Because the proof of the existence of a competitive equilibrium is standard in the literature, it is omitted here (see, for example, Starr, 2011).
Proposition 2. The intermediation core is non-empty.

Intermediation game
Following Townsend (1983) , we consider a non-cooperative intermediation game with endogenous intermediaries. A trader can try to gain market power by offering to intermediate for a group of traders. However, the degree of market power is weakened by competition between intermediaries. Specifically, the game has the two following stages.
Stage 1
Each trader i announces a subset 
When it is not feasible for i to intermediate, both he and his customers stay autarkic. Thus, trader i's consumption bundle is given by
The last part in the first line of the right-hand-side of (5) ensures that it is feasible for the chosen intermediary d i (s) to intermediate.
As described above, the feasible choices of the traders in the second stage depend on the choices of the other traders. 
Specifically, given s and (d
−i (s), z −i (s)), trader i's Stage-2 choice (d i (s), z i (s)) is feasible if (i) z i (s) satisfies (3) when d i (s) ̸ = 0, i
d(·), z(·)).
Because the Stage-2 feasible choices of the traders are mutually dependent, we apply Debreu's (1952) social equilibrium concept to this stage in our determination of an SPE of the two-stage game.
Definition 3. An SPE is a strategy profile (s
Property (i) means that given Stage-1 choice profile s, the profile
) is a social equilibrium for the Stage-2 subgame. Trade in an SPE is stable in the sense that there is no entry of new intermediaries or exit of existing ones, nor is there any customer who wants to switch between the existing intermediaries or any existing intermediary who wants to change its terms. Thus, an SPE induces a natural partition of the traders into stable trading cooperatives.
Main results
We begin with a result that competition between endogenous intermediaries is sufficiently strong that all SPE allocations are contained in the intermediation core. 
∈ F ({3}). In addition, no single trader alone can improve upon the allocation. Because neither trader 1 nor trader 3 is endowed with good 2, they cannot jointly improve upon the allocation. Traders 2 and 3 cannot jointly improve upon the allocation because the maximum amount of good 1 that they are endowed with is 1 unit. Traders 1 and 2 cannot jointly improve upon the allocation because their bundles already consist of a Pareto optimal allocation relative to their endowments. Next we show that a grand coalition cannot improve uponx. To illustrate this, consider an arbitrary allocation x. For U 
As a result, trader 1's utility level is
Because U 1 x 1  = 4.5 andρ < 7/9, the preceding equation
. This shows that trader 1 has an 6 Note that the prices of the intermediating trader must be strictly positive. This can be illustrated as follows. Suppose that trader 1 is a customer. Then, the price of good 1 must be strictly positive for him to be able to afford (5.5, 4.5). If the price of good 2 is zero, then trader 1 would demand bundle (10, 10) which is not feasible. If trader 2 is the customer, however, then the price of good 2 must be positive for him to be able to afford bundle (4.5, 4.5). Hence, if the price of good 1 is zero, then trader 2 would demand bundle (9, 9), which is not compatible with trader 1 receiving (5.5, 4.5).
incentive to deviate. Because (s, d, z) is arbitrary, the allocationx cannot be an SPE allocation.
A partial converse of Theorem 1 is given in the following theorem, which shows that an intermediation core allocation is also an SPE allocation of the intermediation game, provided that all intermediaries in the supporting intermediary structure have at least two customers. Recall that C * k contains the intermediating trader. Thus, |C * k | ≥ 3 means that there are two or more customers. This condition ensures that, for any active intermediary, there are always two contestable intermediaries who are ready to serve all customers at the same price vector. As illustrated in Example 2, this condition is indispensable.
Conclusion
In this paper we applied the approach proposed by Townsend (1983) to consider trading in an exchange economy through endogenous intermediaries. Under this approach, each trader has the opportunity to form an intermediary by offering to buy and sell commodities at a certain price vector for a certain group of customers. We introduced an intermediation core by reformulating coalitional feasible allocations. Like the inclusion of the competitive equilibrium allocations in the usually studied core, we showed that the subgame perfect equilibrium allocations of an intermediation game of Townsend (1983) are contained in the intermediation core. Furthermore, an intermediation core allocation is a subgame perfect equilibrium allocation if each supporting intermediary has two or more customers. This paper contributes to the literature on intermediation by providing tools for the characterization of the subgame perfect equilibrium allocations of intermediation games and for analyzing their welfare and stability properties. 
Let p be the price vector that supports
∈ F (C) and choose i ∈ C whose bundle x i does not maximize U i subject to budget constraint at price vector p.
7 Now, consider s i = (p, C ). By (A.1), each trader j ∈ C with j ̸ = i chooses to trade with i due to the maximality of Stage-2 choices. That is, j chooses
Because (x j ) j∈C ∈ F (C) and p is the supporting price vector,
(1) and (2) imply that z * j (s i , s * −i ) = x j − ω j for all j ∈ C . Thus, by (3) and (A.2), trader j ∈ C receives bundle x j at 7 In case everyone's bundle maximizes utility subject to budget constraint, choose j arbitrarily.
), x * cannot be an SPE allocation of the intermediation game. This is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 2. Given price vector p, we use x i (p) to denote the solution for utility maximization problem (2). For k = 1, 2, . . . , m, let j k 1 ∈ C * k be the intermediating trader and j path, we only need to specify traders' choices at the off-equilibrium paths for cases, in which a single trader deviates. Let j be the trader who contemplates deviating from his Stage-1 choice s * j to s j = (p, C ) ̸ = s * j , while the other traders stick to theirs in s * −j . In what follows, we first construct maximal choices for all non-deviating traders. Recall that j will stay autarkic if it is not feasible for him to intermediate. In that case, he cannot be better off deviating. Thus, without loss of generality, we assume that it is feasible for j to intermediate.
There are six mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive cases depending on the structure of the set of excluded members, C * k \C, and the identity of the deviating trader j.
• • Case 4: |C * k 
and customer set {b i , c i }:
The locus of these bundles is represented by the G-H curve in Fig. B.1(b) . We take the G-H curve and the dashed lines connected to it to be an indifference curve for type a. We now show that an allocation achievable by the intermediary
is in the intermediation core. There are five cases with different conditional structures. Let C ⊂ N be a candidate coalition. , which is lower than 3 7
, the minimum utility level of b i as a customer in the proposed intermediaries (see point F ).
(
To make both type-b traders strictly better off, the price ratio must be smaller than min{ρ 1 , ρ 2 }.
This will make a type-c trader worse off. Hence, C cannot improve upon the candidate allocation. A similar argument applies to coalitions: , the maximum consumption level of good 2 for a type-a trader is strictly less than 10.054 (see point H in Fig. B.1(b) ). This implies that no type-a traders can be better off. In addition to the G-H curve being an indifference curve, we also require that on the budget line K -N, bundle M is optimal for each type a trader as a price-taking customer. To achieve such an allocation, her net-trade is given by segment O-M. Consequently, the opposite trade position relative to an allocation K will be the net trade of a 1 as an intermediary (see Fig. B.2(b) ). Using a similar-triangles argument, we can show that the segment O-M is always longer than segment K-M.
11 As a result, the consumption bundle of a 1 (allocation N) is always below the G-H indifference curve of type a. Again, we define type a's preferences using indifference curves in Fig. B.2(b) . This implies that the intermediating trader is worse off. The similar argument applies to cases in which b i or c j is the intermediating trader.
